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Militar israeliá compara les bombes contra Beyruth amb Guernika.
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per nopasaran |
14 set 2006
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Um militar amb conciència?
Malament estan els nazi-sionistes si fins i tot els seus propis militars fan una crítica "antisemita" "antijueua"(segons el seu llenguatge habitual) o "progreislamista"". |
Un militar israelí equipara el ataque aéreo de Beirut con el de Gernika
El coronel en la reserva de la Fuerza Aérea israelí Samuel Gordon ha criticado el ataque aéreo contra el barrio libanés de Dahaya, al sur de Beirut, y lo ha comparado con el de la Alemania nazi contra Gernika.
Gordon, un destacado estratega de Israel en combates aéreos, ha hecho estas consideraciones en el quinto Congreso Internacional sobre Terrorismo que se celebra en Israel, según informa el diario Maariv.
"No puedo aceptar que la Fuerza Aérea israelí bombardee todo un barrio hasta sus cimientos", ha dicho el militar en alusión a los ataques de la Fuerza Aérea durante la guerra contra la milicia libanesa de Hizbulá, cuyo líder y principales jefes, según las autoridades militares, se ocultaban en esa zona de Beirut.
Diapositiva del mural de Picasso
"No tengo en mi poder la información con que cuenta la Fuerza Aérea pero, en principio, no se puede admitir la destrucción de todo un barrio", ha dicho Gordon a los participantes.
Al concluir su disertación, en la ciudad de Herzlía, ha proyectado una diapositiva del célebre mural de Pablo Picasso sobre el bombardeo alemán de Gernika, en abril de 1937, que causó la muerte a 1.600 residentes de esa localidad, a la que dejó en ruinas.
Crítica con el Ejército
El director del Instituto de la Política Antiterrorista, Shabtai Shavit, exjefe de los Servicios Secretos (Mosad), ha replicado a Gordon diciendo: "Nosotros no atacamos el barrio de Dahaya sino las jefaturas de Hizbulá, cuyos dirigentes eligieron establecerlas en el corazón de Beirut, y en medio de la población civil".
Gordon, doctor universitario en su especialidad, es conocido en Israel por sus críticas a las Fuerzas Armadas de su país. |
This work is in the public domain |
Comentaris
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Re: Militar israeliá compara les bombes contra Beyruth amb Guernika.
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per david |
14 set 2006
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una vegada mes queda demostrat que els mes fanatics en tot el conflicte son els sionistes i els borregos que des dels seus despatxos comodissims a europa en fan un seguiment cec
ara sortiran dient que la gran democracia d'Israel permet les veus discrepants, si la mateixa cosa (comparar Israel amb els nazis!) l'hagues dit un no jueu, aquest seria un islamofeixista, un indyota, un progreimbecil,...
sabeu? el vostre discurs no s'aguanta per enlloc i cardeu fastic |
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Re: Militar israeliá compara les bombes contra Beyruth amb Guernika.
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per Redado |
14 set 2006
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Esta noticia ya ha aparecido antes. Se ha acabado hablando de Dresde. En Gernika no murieron 1600 sino como mucho, mucho 150 personas. |
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Re: Militar israeliá compara les bombes contra Beyruth amb Guernika.
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per enredado |
14 set 2006
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Solo murieron 150 personas y ademas fueron los comunistas Verdad? |
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Re: Militar israeliá compara les bombes contra Beyruth amb Guernika.
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per Redado |
14 set 2006
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No. Fue la aviación alemana a las órdenes de Franco. Pero otras ciudades como Irún, si las quemaron los Gudaris, o los republicanos en retirada. |
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IntoxiquYmedia ha aconseguit manipular l'Institut de Contraterrorisme Israelia!
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per quanta ignorancia la del sionista |
15 set 2006
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Primer de tot insistir un cop mes al borrego que escriu aqui dalt que no som antisemites, sino ANTISIONISTES! Per molt que vulgueu criminalitzar-nos sou vosaltres els criminals ignorants.
Encyclopedia - DEF - Panel 2: Conduction of the War
• Chair, Col. (Res.) Adv. Lior Lotan, Executive Director, ICT
• Maj. Gen. (Res.) Giora Eiland, Former Head of Israel’s National Security Council
• Dr. (Col. Res.) Shmuel Gordon, Head of the Technology and National Security Program, Holon Institute of Technology
• Brig. Gen. (Res.) Ran Ronen (Pekker), Former Senior Commander, Israeli Air Force
• Brig. Gen. Danny Van-Buren, Chief Reserve Officer, IDF
• Maj. Gen. (Res.) Yoram Yair (Ya Ya)
http://www.ictconference.org/index.php?sid=119&lang=en&act=encyclopedia&
Es mes, la noticia "fabricada" per intoxiqumedia ha enganyat a mig mon!
http://www.estadao.com.br/ultimas/mundo/noticias/2006/set/12/78.htm
http://www.medioscomunitarios.org/libano/index.php?id=33&idn=212
http://www.unionradio.com.ve/Noticias/Noticia.aspx?noticiaid=180975
http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/efe/2006/09/12/ult1808u74381.jhtm
La noticia mare a Maariv no l'he trovat perque el website esta en hebreu i no l'entenc, tu prosionista descerebrat, suposo que l'entendras i ens podras demostrar que tot es una mentida, oi?
Articles apareguts al Jerusalem Post, on Shmuel Gordon es columnista, on reiteradament parla dels perills de l'atac per als civils del liban:
Try envelopment instead of conquest
[Daily Edition]
Jerusalem Post - Jerusalem
Author: SHMUEL GORDON
Date: Aug 9, 2006
Start Page: 02
Section: News
Text Word Count: 494
Abstract (Document Summary)
Paradoxically, France and other EU countries are pursuing an agreement that may harm their long-term interests in the region and their internal interests by preserving the power of Hizbullah. That terror organization has replaced al-Qaida, temporarily, as the leading edge of international terrorism, of Shi'te fundamentalism and of extreme, violent organizations in Europe, known and unknown.
The IDF campaign may weaken Hizbullah to the level that the Lebanese government and its army will be able to move south and accept authority in southern Lebanon. But due to the overly protracted tempo of the advance, that campaign may become too ugly and too gradual, and the lives of many civilians will be at risk.
In this conflict, diplomatic initiative has been hinted at previously. It emphasized initiating negotiations with Syria, above or under the table, because only Syria is able to control Hizbullah and to negotiate on its behalf.
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/jpost/access/1094039871.html?dids=1094039871:1094039871&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Aug+9%2C+2006&author=SHMUEL+GORDON&pub=Jerusalem+Post&edition=&startpage=02&desc=Try+envelopment+instead+of+conquest
Preparing a strategy for the 'Day After'
[Daily Edition]
Jerusalem Post - Jerusalem
Author: SHMUEL L. GORDON
Date: Aug 2, 2006
Start Page: 19
Section: News
Text Word Count: 466
Abstract (Document Summary)
The agreement will be signed by Lebanon, Israel and the UN. The dissenters - Hizbullah and Syria, which will not be partners in the cease-fire - will not be responsible for implementing it. Therefore, they will continue to cooperate in regrouping, rebuilding and re-equipping Hizbullah for the next campaign.
Our improved strategy must accentuate focused small- scale and covert operations, instead of near all-out war in which the Lebanese people suffer more than Hizbullah. It should emphasize, more than ever, accurate, real-time, reliable intelligence, to prevent terrible mistakes. This operational strategy will make use of integrated, airborne and special teams and task forces, and prevent Syria and other countries from supplying Hizbullah. This type of strategy is designed to enable us to control the intensity of operations.
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/jpost/access/1088215201.html?dids=1088215201:1088215201&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Aug+2%2C+2006&author=SHMUEL+L.+GORDON&pub=Jerusalem+Post&edition=&startpage=19&desc=Preparing+a+strategy+for+the+%27Day+After%27
Now is the time for a better use of air power
[Daily Edition]
Jerusalem Post - Jerusalem
Author: SHMUEL L. GORDON
Date: Jul 27, 2006
Start Page: 07
Section: News
Text Word Count: 821
Abstract (Document Summary)
Wednesday's casualties in Bint Jbail may indicate that Hizbullah has managed, yet again, to neutralize the IAF's technological advantages. The proper use of air power against a terrorist or guerrilla formation takes time, and herein lies Israel's problem.
The massive bombings - the IAF's use of brute force - has its limitations with respect to high-value targets, and the deployment of ground troops neutralizes our advantages. When a soldier meets a soldier, when a Kalashnikov meets an M-16, when the fight is eye to eye, there are no technological advantages. It will always be like this.
Hizbullah has no qualms about losing 50 fighters, whereas we Israelis do, and the Islamists know it. Wednesday's battle will give Hizbullah a huge morale boost - regardless of how many fighters they have lost.
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/jpost/access/1087528391.html?dids=1087528391:1087528391&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Jul+27%2C+2006&author=SHMUEL+L.+GORDON&pub=Jerusalem+Post&edition=&startpage=07&desc=Now+is+the+time+for+a+better+use+of+air+power
Fragments d'un analisi del militar Shmuel Gordon, que segons els sionistes no existeix, on insisteix en que s'ha d'anar en compte en no matar poblacio civil:
The Vulture and The Snake
Counter-Guerrilla Air Warfare:
The War in Southern Lebanon
Shmuel L. Gordon
1.3.3 Definition of the Enemy
Prior to the 1982 Lebanon War, the PLO used the area as a base for hostile operations against Israel. The Palestinian presence and the threat it created, along with the Litani Operation's failure to remove the threat, were among the circumstances that brought about the Lebanon War.
This controversial war actually achieved some successes - one of which was the expulsion of the Palestinian terrorists from Southern Lebanon. But nature abhors a vacuum; the newborn Hizballah movement's military wing entrenched itself in the area, close to the security zone, and this new enemy was much more motivated, skilled, and well-organized than its predecessor. Israel, by reason of its moral values, domestic public opinion, and the IDF fighting ethos, cannot direct its forces against the Hizballah's civilian organizations, even though this decreases the effectiveness of IDF operations. Consequently, the military wing alone is defined as the actual enemy. The long-term ethic code of promoting moral values at the expense of short-term effectiveness is valid in most counter-guerrilla conflicts.
1.3.5.4 Deterrent Image
The IDF's deterrence has been eroded during the recent years of the Southern Lebanon War. Counter-guerrilla obstruction is based on the success of almost every operation and a very high loss rate in favor of the IDF. Some failures and significant changes in the loss-rate are two factors in the diminishing of deterrence. Nevertheless, IDF special operations are part of a non-systematic policy that concentrates - or should concentrate - on reestablishing deterrence. While routine activity has a limited effect, the two relatively large scale operations restored IDF's position. The status quo in the area, and the agreement not to attack civilian villages on both sides, is a direct result of the 'Grapes of Wrath' Operation.
Another element of deterrence is immediate reaction and punishment. Such operations are frequent, mostly executed by artillery, and attack aircraft. However, there is no confirmation of the assumption that immediate reaction and punishment enhances deterrence, and decreases Hizballah activities in numbers or degree of risk-taking. This is probably due to the absence of a consistent, declared policy of deterrence.
1.3.7.1 Intelligence
Intelligence gathering and targeting in Southern Lebanon is one of the most perplexing challenges. The Hizballah has made remarkable improvements in its activities, operating in small teams, hiding among civilians in villages, and moving under the concealment of the hills. However, since sensor technology came into use, new options are available for gathering the needed data in near real time, and the IDF should be able to significantly improve its performance.
http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/books/39pub.html
Un altre article del coronel on insisteix en que les victimes civils han de disminuir:
Analysis: Now is the time for a better use of air power
SHMUEL L. GORDON
A hard and fast rule of war is that the use of ground forces in urban combat is directly related to loss of life. In Gaza, the IDF has somehow learned to go in and get out with few casualties. Hizbullah is a different enemy, with different equipment, a different surrounding population and, perhaps, a greater motivation to fight.
Wednesday's casualties in Bint Jbail may indicate that Hizbullah has managed, yet again, to neutralize the IAF's technological advantages. The proper use of air power against a terrorist or guerrilla formation takes time, and herein lies Israel's problem.
Last week in Maroun a-Ras, several soldiers died fighting Hizbullah around their fortified bunkers. The correct use of military power in that situation would have been to use small special forces teams equipped with nothing more than GPS trackers, laser pointers and Uzi submachine guns.
The elite forces, instead of going into the bunkers, could have laser-painted the bunkers' positions to the IAF, which would have destroyed them. That would be the correct way to leverage Israel's technological advantage.
The massive bombings - the IAF's use of brute force - has its limitations with respect to high-value targets, and the deployment of ground troops neutralizes our advantages. When a soldier meets a soldier, when a Kalashnikov meets an M-16, when the fight is eye to eye, there are no technological advantages. It will always be like this.
Hizbullah has no qualms about losing 50 fighters, whereas we Israelis do, and the Islamists know it. Wednesday's battle will give Hizbullah a huge morale boost - regardless of how many fighters they have lost.
During the Lebanon War, I was in charge of the air force's underground command bunker. Every time the infantrymen got themselves into trouble, they would call on the IAF to "open the roads."
This usually entailed civilian casualties. The air force chief at the time, Maj.-Gen. David Ivri, demanded that the ground forces provide quality intelligence to ensure that civilians were not being accidentally targeted.
That is still the key now.
Counterterror air warfare strategy has developed a great deal in recent years. It is now based on new intelligence technologies that have enabled airborne systems to locate small mobile vehicles such as rocket launchers, and even a pair of terrorists trying to launch a Kassam rocket, and precision-guided munitions, which have made it possible to hit such targets quickly and accurately.
The most important characteristic of these systems is their ability to preserve the lives of innocent people located near the targeted terrorist.
To find, designate (by laser-painter, for example) and hit terrorists in a limited time frame, teams of special forces should join the battle. The new strategy integrates intelligence, air power and special forces into a combined force that plans its missions as surgical operations.
Intelligence officers search for the highest-value targets, including leaders of the terrorist organization, its training infrastructure, professionals who produce dangerous bombs, and those who recruit suicide bombers.
The strategy is based on the assumption that it is almost impossible to demolish terror organizations in a short, intense war. On the contrary, the preferred scenario is a war of attrition. Step by step, operation by operation, the light at the end of the tunnel becomes brighter. Counterterror air warfare doctrine emphasizes using air power in a different way than in large-scale conventional warfare. The new doctrine prefers a longer but lower-intensity conflict.
The Israel Air Force's operations in the current campaign do not even come close to conforming to this concept. The government is attempting to use the air force's brute force to crush Hizbullah and to compel the powerless Lebanese government to control southern Lebanon with its own toothless army.
Throughout military history, there have been gaps between doctrine and reality. In the current case, the gap is particularly large, created by the government's ignorance of the appropriate strategy. The cabinet is ignoring, or simply doesn't understand, the principles of modern counterterrorism, especially those relating to air power.
The cabinet needs to take into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence/air power/special forces mixture. It is the duty of the IDF General Staff to acquaint the civilian leadership with the limitations and capabilities of air power. The government need to have the information to set the goals, which will then dictate the military means and strategy.
There is no alternative. -------- Dr. Shmuel L. Gordon, a colonel (res.) in the IAF, is head of the Technology and National Security program at the Holon Institute of Technology, and an expert in national security, air warfare and counterterrorism. He is also the author of The Vulture and the Snake: Counter-Guerrilla Air Warfare: The War in Southern Lebanon.
THE JERUSALEM POST July 26, 2006
http://israelbehindthenews.com/Archives/Jul-27-06.htm
Mes analisi ilitar on Gordon insisteix en evitar morts de civils:
Analysis: Israel Eyes Wider War
Council on Foreign Relations
August 9, 2006
Prepared by: Michael Moran
With the Israeli public in broad agreement about the need to teach Hezbollah a lesson (NYT), and prospects diminishing for the quick deployment of an international buffer force (WashPost), Israel warned of an expanded ground campaign. The aim is to deny its Katyusha-laden enemy access to territory within rocket range of major population centers. Haaretz reports this means a full Israeli occupation up to the Litani River, roughly eighteen miles into Lebanon, which approximates the "security zone" Israel abandoned with great fanfare in 2000.
Dennis Ross, former U.S. Middle East envoy, says Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who won the power to order the expansion, may feel compelled to do so because the international community and the Lebanese government are unable to disarm Hezbollah. Israeli Col. Shmuel Gordon, writing in the Jerusalem Post, argues an accelerated ground war ultimately may save lives by passing difficult Hezbollah strongholds and smoothing the way for an international force.
Few outside Israel buy the argument, however, as Lebanese noncombatants continue to bear the brunt of the war. Peter Bouckaert, in Lebanon for Human Rights Watch, tells CFR.org both sides have committed "war crimes." Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora writes in the Washington Post: "A military solution to Israel's savage war on Lebanon and the Lebanese people is both morally unacceptable and totally unrealistic." Diplomacy, however, appears barely alive. UN Security Council talks dominated by the United States and France have reached stalemate.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/08/mil-060809-c
Veus creti? Aixo es el que passa per voler ser mes papistes que el papa, que quedeu retratats com a fanatics ignorants. |
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Re: Militar israeliá compara les bombes contra Beyruth amb Guernika.
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per quanta ignorancia la del sionista |
15 set 2006
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queda clar que el meu comentari respon a "Caunta imaginación tiene el antisemita" i "mas", no a "Tot el que no cové als nazi-sionistes..." |
Ja no es poden afegir comentaris en aquest article.
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